Abstract

Questions of loyalty and betrayal animate much of legal ethics. The relationship between an attorney and client is necessarily one of trust. Justice Story warned in 1894 that “[w]hen a client employs as attorney, he has a right to presume . . . he has no engagements, which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the cause confided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judgment, or endanger his fidelity.” This singular notion of attorney loyalty has come to dominate our understanding of the lawyer’s role. But corporations are collective endeavors. They often employ hundreds, thousands, or even millions of individuals. Corporations are managed for the benefit of shareholders, who can also number in the millions. Corporate control can be the subject of fierce battles between warring shareholders or embattled directors and managers. All these basic facts of corporate law complicate the picture of Justice Story’s “exclusive devotion.”

In light of all this complexity, this Article attempts to map how two core legal ethics concepts—loyalty and betrayal—are applied and misapplied to the corporate client. I argue that while the meaning of these concepts in professional responsibility has been developed largely with reference to human clients and progressive causes, the interests that motivate and justify attorney loyalty in these human contexts fails to apply in the same way in the corporate context. In fact, the very nature of the corporate form makes classical conceptions of attorney loyalty impossible and betrayal—in some form—inevitable. So too, corporate law has developed its own definition of loyalty—one that includes commitments to legal obedience. Accordingly, this Article seeks to articulate a more doctrinally consistent understanding of attorney loyalty and betrayal for when that client is a corporation. I propose that the representation of corporate clients should be seen as fundamentally different because of both the corporation’s relationship to the state and corporate activity’s ability to cause large scale public harm.

Over de spreker

Elise Maizel onderzoekt in haar academisch werk de rol van de juridische professie in corporate governance en wangedrag binnen bedrijven. Ze richt zich daarbij op culturele, structurele en doctrinaire factoren die het functioneren van juristen en het gedrag van ondernemingen beïnvloeden. Haar publicaties verschenen of verschijnen binnenkort in gerenommeerde tijdschriften zoals de Cardozo Law Review, DePaul Law Review, Journal of Corporation Law, UC Law Journal en Yale Journal on Regulation’s Notice & Comment.

Voor haar academische carrière was Maizel werkzaam als litigation counsel bij het internationale advocatenkantoor Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. Daar hield zij zich bezig met ondernemingsrecht, faillissementszaken, interne onderzoeken en white-collar defense. Daarnaast voerde zij een actieve pro bono praktijk op het gebied van strafrecht, waaronder zaken over 'capital defense' en 'compassionate release'.

Practicalities

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